Meeting 4 (November 14) Evolution of financial institutions 1200-1800

Required reading:

  • Fratianni, Michele (2006). ``Government Debt, Reputation and Creditors? Protections: The Tale of San Giorgio,'' Review of Finance : Journal of the European Finance Association, Vol. 10 (4), 487-506.

PREP

  • Slides on the Casa di San Giorgio
  • Article by Fratianni (2006) with references to the slides. BRING TO THE CLASS this copy.

Both documents are also in the dropbox folder.

 Other readings will be assigned during the lecture in the following list.

  • Fratianni, Michele and Franco Spinelli (2007). "Did Genoa and Venice kick a financial revolution in the quattrocento?'', WP.
  • Álvarez-Nogal, C. and C. Chamley (2018). "Refinancing short-term debt with a fixed monthly interest rate into funded juros under Philip II: an asiento with the Maluenda brothers," the Economic History Review, 71, 1100-1117.
  • Quinn, Stephen (2008). "Securitization of Sovereign Debt: Corporations as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in Britain, 1694 to 1750," mimeo.
  • North, Douglass, and Barry Weingast (1989). "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic history49, 803-32.
  • Velde, F. (2004). Government Equity and Money: John Law’s System in 1720 France.
  • Chamley, C. (2011). “Interest Reductions in the Politico-Financial Nexus of 18th Century  England,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 71, 555-589.
  • Sutherland, L.S. (1946). “Samson Gideon and the Reduction of Interest: 1749-50,” The Economic History Review, 16, 15-29.
  • Macdonald, James on the South Sea Bubble, pages 205-219
  • Dale, Richard S., Johnie E.V Johnson, and Leilei Tang (2005). "Financial markets can go mad: evidence of irrational behaviour during the South Sea Bubble, " Economic History Review233-271.
  • Sussman, Nathan, and Yishay Yafeh (2005). "Constitutions and Commitment: Evidence on the Relation between institutions and the Cost of Capital," mimeo.

Meeting 1: October 24

  •  Sargent, Thomas, J. and François R. Velde  (1995). ``Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution,'' Journal of Political Economy, 103 (3): 474-518.
  • Antipa, P. and C. Chamley (2018). ``Regimes of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in England  during the French Wars (1793-1821). (Slides).

Meeting 2: October 31

There will be a presentation of the two papers below (20' each). Any student who is not making the presentation should prepare one question to ask.

  1.  Harley, C. Knick and N. F. R. Crafts (2000). "Simulating the Two View of the British Industrial Revolution," the Journal of Economic History, 60 (3), 819-841.
  2. Allen, R. C. (2011). "Why the industrial revolution was British: commerce, induced invention, and the cientific revolution," the Journal of Economic History, 64 (2), 357-384.
  • The assignment is a homework that requires some work. It is in the dropbox folder of the course. Please do not postpone the start of your work until it is too late. The material for the homework is in the dropbox file for the course. The assignment is due Friday November 2, 6pm.
  • When you have time, you may at least browse: Mokyr, J. (2005). "The Intellectual Origin of the Industrial Revolution," The Journal of Economic History, 65, 285-351.
  • Why not Holland? 
    • Bas van Leeuwen  and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2011). "The origins of ‘modern economic growth’?
      Holland between 1500 and 1800," pdf.

Meeting 3: November 7 Institutions (1)

Presentations of papers:

The presentations should be short (max 20', 10 slides).

  1. Dimico, Arcangelo, Alessia Isopi, Ola Olsson (2017). ``Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons,'' The Journal of Economic History,  77. (Matteo). Slides
  2. Acemoglu, D., G. De Feo and G. De Luca (2017). ``Social conflict Mafia, and state capacity,'' mimeo. (Duoxi). Slides

These papers refer to a time shortly that of the landing of Garibaldi in Sicily and the birth of an independent and unified Italy. See Il Gattopardo by Tomasi di Lampedusa, and the classic film by Visconti.

Trade institutions in the Mediterranean and the use of sources

There has been a recent controversy in the small circle of institutions history/contract theory. in preparation for Meeting 3, you should do the following. (The task is not to submit a written work but to build up your personal notes to be prepared for the discussion in the meeting).

Task: 

  • Greif, A. (1993). "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early trade" The Maghribi Trades' Coalition," AER, 525-548.

1. In order to save time, skip the intro, the formalism of Prop 3 (but not the verbal argument around it), and the conclusion. If you are short oftime, ignore the discussion on the Genoese. The main focus (not the only one) in the meeting will be the use of historical sources.

  • Mark all the historical facts that Greif brings to support his argument. For each fact, determine whether the fact actually support the argument. Prepare personal notes on your views  for the class discussion. (There is not need for a "homework assignment"). You may check for more historical facts in the JEH paper of Greif. Is there a key parameter in the model with a specific value? Does the evidence in that paper support this value?
  • It is important that you write down, for yourself, you own evaluation before reading the documents below. Do not be concerned that you may have less information than the author. Make you own call.

2. Read Section I in the following paper, (423-432). Compare with your own previously established notes.

  • Edwards, J. and S. Ogilvie (2012). "Contract enforceability and institutions, and social capital: the Maghribi traders reappraised," EHR, 421-444.

3. Read the answer of Greif (449-454) in the EHR. Make your own observations.

  • Greif, A. (2012). " The Maghribi traders: a reappraisal?," EHR, 445-469.

4. More material and questions will be posted later on:

  • Goldberg, J. (2012). Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean, CUP. Here there are only pages 11-12

5. Additional material to read (important):

  • Goldberg. J. (2012). "Choosing and enforcing business relationships in the eleventh-century mediterranean: reassessing the 'Maghibi traders', Past & Present, 216, 3-40. 

The paper uses the material of the book (above) but focuses on the criticism of Greif, and, in a few paragraphs, on the thesis of Kuran

All the papers are in the dropbox folder for the course. 

 Sargent, Thomas, J. and François R. Velde  (1995). ``Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution,'' Journal of Political Economy, 103 (3): 474-518.Antipa, P. and C. Chamley (2018). ``Regimes of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in England  during the French Wars (1793-1821). (Slides). Harley, C. Knick and N. F. R. Crafts (2000). "Simulating the Two View of the British Industrial Revolution," the Journal of Economic History, 60 (3), 819-841.Allen, R. C. (2011). "Why the industrial revolution was British: commerce, induced invention, and the cientific revolution," the Journal of Economic History, 64 (2), 357-384.

Dimico, Arcangelo, Alessia Isopi, Ola Olsson (2017). ``Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons,'' The Journal of Economic History,  77. (Matteo). Slides

Dimico, Arcangelo, Alessia Isopi, Ola Olsson (2017). ``Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons,'' The Journal of Economic History,  77. (Matteo). SlidesAcemoglu, D., G. De Feo and G. De Luca (2017). ``Social conflict Mafia, and state capacity,'' mimeo. (Duoxi). Slides